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Micro data shows two di®erent patterns of consumption of housing and non-housing goods
over the life cycle. Consumption expenditure of non-housing goods is hump-shaped over the
life cycle: it starts low early in life, rises considerably around middle age, and then falls at
more advanced ages. On the contrary, household holdings of the housing stock are not hump-
shaped: lifetime pro¯le of housing stock is monotonically increasing and then rather °at. The
di®erent patterns of housing and non-housing consumption over the life cycle contradict a key
prediction of the standard life cycle model without market frictions: the ratio of housing and
non-housing consumption should not be age-dependent. That is to say, housing consumption
should follow the same pattern as non-housing consumption.
These stylized facts of life cycle consumption motivate asking which modi¯cations of
the basic life cycle framework could produce the life cycle consumption pro¯les that more
closely resemble the US life cycle consumption pro¯les. To answer this question, I construct a
general equilibrium life cycle model of consumption and saving that explicitly models housing.
Housing has a dual role: it directly provides utility, and it can be used as collateral. In my
framework, households face several frictions: uninsurable labor income risk, lack of annuity
market to insure against uncertain lifetime, borrowing constraints, and transaction costs for
trading houses. Thus households save to self-insure against labor earning shocks and life-span
risk, for retirement, to enjoy services from housing, and possibly to leave bequests to their
children.
I show that a plausibly parameterized version of my model accounts well for the empirical
¯ndings. The interaction between housing (which can be used as collateral) and borrowing
constraints leads to the accumulation of housing stock early in life, while transaction costs
tend to slow the decline of the housing stock later in life. Households begin their economic
lives without any housing stock. During the early part of their lives, because of the existence
of borrowing constraints and the role of housing as a collateral, they build housing stock
quickly and compromise on non-housing consumption. As households age, they start to
decrease their non-housing consumption because their time preference is higher than the
interest rate and mortality rates are increasing along the life cycle. The high transaction
costs associated with trading houses prevent households from decreasing their housing stock
quickly later in life.
I also investigate the quantitative relevance of transaction costs, borrowing constraints
and bequest motives in determining this pattern. I ¯nd that while borrowing constraints
are essential in explaining the accumulation of housing assets early in life, the existence of
transaction costs is crucial in accounting for the slow downsizing of housing pro¯le later
in life. When choosing a new house, forward-looking households take into account future
transaction costs. Thus consumption of housing service will be constant at a new level
until it is worthwhile to incur the transaction costs again. Thus the home purchase decision
2is endogenously infrequent. The bequest motives play a role in determining total lifetime
wealth, but not housing consumption.
The model is able to capture the life cycle wealth portfolio pro¯les. In the US, young
households virtually own no liquid ¯nancial assets, but hold a major fraction of their wealth
as housing. Later in life, households shift their portfolios to ¯nancial assets.
The benchmark model also matches the distribution of wealth, housing and ¯nancial
wealth quite well. It also replicates the empirical ¯nding that inequality in ¯nancial assets
is much higher than housing. Households are allowed to borrow against housing so ¯nancial
assets can be negative but the housing stock can not be. Also the return of housing, marginal
utility of housing, is decreasing, while the return to ¯nancial assets, the interest rate, is
constant. Thus housing as the fraction of net worth is decreasing.
Understanding the life cycle pattern of consumption and assets allocation behavior is
crucial for policy analysis. Identifying a model capable of explaining the housing and non-
housing consumption decisions allows a better understanding of the e®ect of policy reforms.
The house is the single largest expenditure made by consumers over their life time. The
median household has a house which is valued about twice their annual income. Thus the
abstraction from housing may bias the study of life cycle consumption and assets accumula-
tion behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present some empirical results from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) documenting
households' consumption and asset accumulation over the life cycle. In Section 3, I present
my model and de¯ne the equilibrium. The calibration of the model is presented in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the quantitative results of the benchmark model. Section 6 investigates
the quantitative importance of the transaction costs, bequest motives, borrowing constraints
and social security. Brief concluding remarks are provided in Section 7. Technical discussions
about the de¯nition of stationary equilibrium, invariant distribution and bequest distribution,
the calibration of aggregate variables and the computational algorithm are provided in the
appendix.
1.1 Contribution with respect to the literature
Several mechanisms have been o®ered in the literature to study the hump-shaped life cycle
consumption pro¯le, such as, precautionary saving and borrowing constraints (Carroll and
Summers (1991), Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994), Carroll (1997), Gourinchas and Parker
(2002)), variations in household size (Attanasio and Weber (1995), Attanasio et al. (1999)
and Browning and Ejrn½s (2002)), the substitutability of leisure and consumption (Bullard
and Feigenbaum (2004)), and mortality risk (Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2005)). None of them
incorporate housing. Among the literature that study life cycle consumption pro¯le of durable
goods, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) document that consumption expenditure is
hump-shaped over the life cycle and this pattern holds for consumption expenditures on both
3non-durables and durables, even after controlling for the demographic characteristics of the
households. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2001) show that a plausibly parameterized
version of the life cycle model with endogenous borrowing constraints can explain the pattern
of durable and nondurable consumption expenditure. However, their model cannot generate
the slow decline of the housing stock. Heathcote (2002) incorporates home production in an
otherwise standard model to account for the drop of consumption at retirement.
There are several papers that exploit the idea that in the presence of collateralized loans,
borrowing constraints distort the intratemporal allocation of resources between durables and
non-durables (see, for example, Brugianini and Weber (1992), Chah et al. (1995), Alessie et
al. (1997), Jappelli (1990), and Attanasio et al. (2000)). In contrast to the above literature
that tests the empirical signi¯cance of borrowing constraint from the data, I impose bor-
rowing constraints in the model in conjunction with the transaction costs and maintenance-
remodeling option.
This paper is related to the strands of optimal portfolio choice in the presence of consumer
durables, such as Grossman and Laroque (1990), Cocco (2000), Flavin and Yamashita (2002),
Flavin and Nakagawa (2002), Campbell and Cocco (2003), and Yao and Zhang (2005), and
Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006). In contrast with most models of household portfolio choice
that explicitly include the presence of durables, I model housing in a general equilibrium
setting.
Among the literature on life cycle general equilibrium models that incorporate bequest
motives, De Nardi (2004) constructs a model in which parents and children are linked by
accidental and voluntary bequests and by earning ability and shows that voluntary bequests
can explain the emergence of large estates and the long upper tail of the wealth distribution.
I generalize her framework by modeling housing and transaction costs. Ocampo and Yuki
(2002) use a similar framework to investigate the quantitative importance of di®erent saving
motives on wealth inequality and aggregate capital accumulation. Laitner (2001) uses an
overlapping generations model with both life cycle saving and altruistic bequest to match
the high degree of wealth concentration and analyzes the impact of changes in national debt
and social security on capital output ratio.
2 Empirical Findings
This section presents my empirical ¯ndings on consumption of non-housing and housing over
the life cycle. I ¯rst study the life cycle pro¯le of consumption of non-housing goods using
data from the CEX. I deal explicitly with the changes of household size along the life cycle.
Then I look at the life cycle pro¯le of the net worth, housing stock and ¯nancial assets derived
from the SCF, controlling for cohort and time e®ects.
The CEX is carried out by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and is a random sample
rotating panel that contains information on demographic characteristics, inventory of major
4housing and consumption expenditure. The survey consists of a quarterly Interview Survey
in which each consumer unit in the sample is interviewed every three months over a 15-
month period, and a Diary Survey which is completed by the sample consumer units for two
consecutive one-week periods. The Interview Survey is designed to collect data on major
items of expense, household characteristics, and income. The expenditures covered by the
survey are those that respondents can recall fairly accurately for three months or longer.
The CEX is the only micro-level data set reporting comprehensive measures of consumption
expenditure for a large cross-section of households in the US.
I use the 2001 CEX data to estimate life cycle pro¯le of non-housing consumption expen-
ditures1. I take each household as one observation and use the age of the reference person
regardless of the person's gender. I de¯ne 10 cohorts with a length of 5 years, starting
from age 20. Only households with positive consumption expenditure are selected. The
data on \expenditure on non-housing consumption" include food, alcoholic beverages, to-
bacco, personal care, utilities, household operations, household furnishings and equipment,
transportation, books and electronic equipment, apparel, out-of-pocket health expenditure,
entertainment and miscellaneous expenditures.
















Figure 1: Non-housing consumption
Figure 1 plots total household annual expenditure on non-housing goods against the head
of the household's age. Estimated consumption increases from around $15,400 to nearly
$29,300, and then decreases to about $17,700. The peak is reached at age forty-¯ve. The size
of the hump, measured by the ratio of consumption expenditure between the peak and the
beginning of the life cycle, is around 1.9. The consumption expenditure on non-housing goods
declines dramatically later in life. The pattern of non-housing consumption is similar to the
pattern of nondurable consumption reported in F ernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002).
1Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) use the CEX data to construct a pseudo panel. They ¯nd that
the results from using pseudo panel and controlling for cohort and time e®ects is similar to results from using
cross-section data. For simplicity I thus use only the 2001 CEX data.

















Figure 2: Non-housing consumption (quartiles)
If we go beyond mean consumption and look at the distribution of consumption, the
hump-shaped non-housing consumption pattern still holds. For example, Figure 2 plots total
household expenditure on non-housing goods at the mean level and at each quartile. We
observe that the non-housing consumption is hump-shaped at each quartile. We also see that
mean consumption is higher than the median, and lower than the 3rd quartile at each age.
This indicates that the distribution of consumption at each age is skewed to the right.
Households of di®erent size plausibly face di®erent marginal utilities from the same con-
sumption expenditure. Consequently, changes in household size might explain the hump in
consumption (Attanasio and Weber (1995) and Attanasio et al. (1999)). Thus I adjust the
data for the change in household size along the life cycle using equivalence scales, which
quantify the change in consumption expenditure needed to keep the welfare of families con-
stant, regardless of its size (see for example Zeldes (1989), Blundell, Browning and Meghir
(1994)). I use the same equivalence scales as Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002), which
are close to the equivalence scales of the Department of Health and Human Services (Federal
Register (1991)), the estimates of Johnson and Garner (1995) and to the constant-elasticity
equivalence scales used by Atkinson et al. (1995), Buhmann et al. (1988) and Johnson and
Smeeding (1998), among others. Table 1 shows the equivalence scales I use.
Family Size 1 2 3 4 5
Equivalence scales 1 1.34 1.65 1.97 2.27
Table 1: Equivalence scales
I take non-housing consumption expenditure from the CEX and the demographic infor-
mation of the household, and adjust consumption using the above equivalence scales. Figure 3
plots the estimated adjusted life cycle pro¯le of adult-equivalent expenditure on non-housing
goods. The adjusted consumption increases from around $12,000 to nearly $18,900 and then
6decreases to about $14,400. The peak in adjusted consumption is postponed to age ¯fty-
¯ve. The size of the hump, measured by the ratio of consumption expenditure between the
peak and the beginning of the life cycle, is around 1.6. The consumption expenditure on
non-housing goods declines dramatically later in life. We observe that the non-housing con-
sumption is hump-shaped at each quartile. We also see that the distribution of consumption
at each age is skewed to the right. The results are robust to using di®erent equivalence scales.













Figure 3: Non-housing consumption (adult equivalent)
I then use the SCF data to estimate the life cycle pro¯le of housing stock, net worth and
non-housing assets controlling for cohort and time e®ects. I construct synthetic cohorts by
using six waves of the SCF (1983-1998). I use the age of the reference person to de¯ne 10
cohorts with a length of 5 years, starting from age 20, and follow them through the whole
sample, generating a panel. F or example, the households born between 1958-1963 were 20-25
years old in 1983. The pseudo panel approach treats the 23-28 year-old households in the 1986
wave as if they were the same people as the 20-25 year-old in the 1983 data. The grouping
in cells is done to keep the number of observations relatively big, and most of the cells I
use have about 300 observations. Housing, net worth and non-housing assets are de°ated
to be in 1983 dollars using the CPI price index. Housing asset is the value of the primary
residential house. Renters are also included in the sample. I control for cohort, time, and age
e®ects by employing a semi-nonparametric partially linear model. Details of the estimation
are available in Y ang (2006).
Figure 4 plots the estimated housing stock over the life cycle from the SCF. The estimated
housing value increases until age sixty-¯ve, and then °attens out until the end of the life
cycle. That is to say , if the service °ow from housing is proportional to housing stock, then
consumption from housing is not hump-shaped.
Figure 5 plots housing stock at the mean level and at each quartile. W e observe that
the housing consumption is increasing and then °attens out at each quartile. Also mean













4 Estimated housing stock from SCF (in 1983 $)
housing
Figure 4: Housing consumption
















Figure 5: Housing consumption (quartiles)
consumption is higher than the median at each age, indicating that the distribution of housing
consumption at each age is also skewed to the right.
The ¯nding that elderly households do not decrease their housing consumption is consis-
tent with the empirical ¯ndings from other literature. F or example, F einstein and McF adden
(1989) suggest that more than one-third of elderly households reside in dwellings with at least
three more rooms than the number of inhabitants, and are thus consuming large housing ser-
vices. F ernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) show that, when controlling for time and
cohort e®ects, the peak of (market valued) housing service does not occur until age ¯fty-¯ve,
then decreases slightly , and then °attens out until the end of the life cycle.
T o isolate the e®ect of homeownership on housing assets, I also estimate the pro¯le of
housing assets, for homeowners only . Figure 6 shows the smoothed age pro¯le of housing
assets, for homeowner only , for mean, 1st quartile, median and 3rd quartile. Compared with
Figure 5, the pro¯les for homeowners have similar pattern as the pro¯les for homeowners and
















Figure 6: Housing consumption (owners)
renters together, but the levels are higher. This is simply because Figure 5 are estimated
from samples containing renters who don't have any housing assets.












































Figure 7: Ratio of housing to non-housing consumption
Figure 7 plots the ratio of housing to non-housing consumption, when I normalize the
ratio at age 20 to be 1. This ratio is increasing over the life cycle, reaching 5 (per household)
and 7 (per adult equivalent) at age 75 2.
The di®erent patterns of housing and non-housing consumption over the life cycle thus
contradict to a key prediction of the standard life cycle model without market frictions,
age-dependent utility of consumption from housing and non-housing or home production:
the ratio of housing and non-housing consumption should not be age-dependent. That is to
say, consumption of housing should follow the same pattern as non-housing consumption.
2I do not adjust family size for housing consumption. Nelson (1988) ¯nds that the economics of scale in
shelter is so high that \two can live as cheap as one".
9Appendix 8.1 describes the implication of this standard life cycle model in greater detail.
















Figure 8: Age pro¯le of wealth composition
I now show the patterns of wealth accumulation and portfolio composition over the life
cycle. Figure 8 plots mean net worth, housing stock, ¯nancial assets against the head of the
household's age. Y oung agents tend to hold little wealth. Early in life households borrow to
buy houses, and thus save in the form of housing. As time goes by , agents have built stocks
of houses and start to increase their holding of ¯nancial assets. The pro¯les of ¯nancial
assets and housing assets intersect in their early 40's. Their wealth holding peaks at age 70.
However, we do not observe quick decumulation of wealth later in life. Instead, households
continue to hold large amount of wealth.
3 The Model
The economy is a discrete-time overlapping generation world with an in¯nitely-lived govern-
ment. The government taxes labor earnings, and provides pensions to the retirees. There are
idiosyncratic income shocks. There are no state contingent markets for the household speci¯c
shocks. The only ¯nancial instrument is a one-period bond. Housing has a dual role: it pro-
vides utility as consumption goods, and it can be used as collateral thus the borrowing limit
of each household depends on the value of the house. Trading of houses incurs transaction
costs. For simplicity, I assume there is no housing rental market.
3.1 Technology
There is one type of goods produced according to the aggregate production function F(K;L)
where K is the aggregate capital stock and L is the aggregate labor input. I assume a
standard Cobb-Douglas functional form. The ¯nal goods can be either consumed or invested
into physical capital or transformed into housing. Physical capital and housing depreciate at
rate ±k and ±h, respectively. Let H denote the aggregate housing stock in the current period,
10C the aggregate consumption of non-housing, Ih the aggregate investment on housing, Ik
the aggregate investment on physical capital goods, Tc the total transaction costs for trading
housing, respectively. The aggregate resource constraint is:
(1) F(K;L) = K®L1¡® = C + Ik + Ih + Tc:
Households rent capital and e±cient labor units to the representative ¯rm each period
and receive rental income at the interest rate r and wage income at the wage rate w.
3.2 Demographics
During each model period, which is 5 years long, a continuum of people is born. I denote
age t = 1 as 20 years old, age t = 2 as 25 years old, and so on. At age 20 each person enters
into the model and start working and consuming. Since there are no inter-vivos transfers,
all agents start their economic life with no ¯nancial assets and no houses. At the beginning
of period 3, the agent's children are born, and four periods later (when the agent is 50 years
old) the children are 20 and start working. The agents are retired at t = 10 (i.e., when they
are 65 years old) and die for sure by the end of age T = 12 (i.e., before turning 80 years
old). From t = 10 (i.e., when they are 65 years old), each person faces a positive probability
of dying given by (1 ¡ pt). The probability of dying is exogenous and independent of other
household characteristics. The population grows at rate n. Since the demographic patterns
are stable, agents at age t make up a constant fraction of the population at any point in
time. Figure 9 illustrates the demographics in the model.
3.3 Timing and information
At the beginning of each period, households observe their idiosyncratic earning shocks and
possibly receive some inheritance from their parents. Then labor and capital are supplied to
¯rms and production takes place. Next, the households receive factor payments and make
their consumption and asset allocation decisions. Housing stocks are not transferred until
the end of the period. Thus the addition or subtraction to the stock will not in°uence the
present period service °ow. Finally uncertainty about early death is revealed.
The idiosyncratic labor productivity status is private information and the survival status
is public information. I assume that children can observe their parent's productivity when
their parent is 50 and the children are 20.
3.4 Consumer's maximization problem
3.4.1 Preferences
Individuals derive utility from consumption of non-housing goods, c; from the service °ow
of the housing, h and from bequests transferred to their children upon death. Preferences
11Generation   t-6 
(Parents)   50      55      60 65     70      75      80 
Generation   t
         20      25      30      35      40      45     50     55     60      65       70      75     80   
          procreate             death shock 
                      
Generation   t+6
(Children)   20      25      30   35       40      45     50
Figure 9: Demographics
are assumed to be time separable, with a constant discount factor ¯. The momentary utility





I choose g(c;h) = (!c¾ + (1 ¡ !)h¾)
1
¾; and h is assumed to be equal to the value of housing
stock.
Following De Nardi (2004), the utility from bequest is denoted by
(3) Á(b) = Á1(1 + b=Á2)1¡´:
The term Á1 re°ects the parent's concern about leaving bequests to his/her children, while
Á2 measures the extent to which bequests are luxury goods3.
3.4.2 Transaction costs
Due to the heterogeneity of housing and the spatial ¯xity of housing, both potential buyers
and sellers in the housing market are forced to spend considerable amount of time and resource
3Note that this form of `impure' bequest motives implies that an individual cares about the bequests left
to his/her children, but not about consumption of his/her children. If an individual is assumed to care about
utility of his/her children, and both parents and kids are maximizing utility as di®erent units, the strategic
interaction across generations complicates the analysis.
12to acquire information about the value of a speci¯c housing units. As a consequence, there
are both implicit and explicit search costs associated with moving (Chinloy (1980)). These
include opportunity cost of time associated with market search, brokerage and agent fee,
recording fee, legal fee, origination fee. Besides, households have to physically move to
a new house, which entail moving costs and psychological costs of breaking neighborhood
attachments (Smith, Rosen, Fallis (1988)).
I consider non-convex transaction costs in the housing stock. A household can buy a
stock of any size, but once the stock has been bought, it is illiquid. I force the household to
pay transaction costs every time the household sells and buys a new house. The speci¯cation
of the transaction costs is:
(4) ¿(h;h0) =
(
0 if h0 2 [(1 ¡ ¹1)h; (1 + ¹2)h]
½1h + ½2h0 otherwise.
This formulation of transaction costs allow households to change their level of housing
consumption by undertaking housing renovation up to a fraction of ¹2 the value of house or
by allowing depreciation up to a fraction of ¹1 the value of house as an alternative to moving.
If the households let the housing depreciate by more that a fraction ¹1 of the value, or if the
value of the stock increases by more that a fraction ¹2 of the value, I assume that the stock
has been sold. In those cases, the household has to pay the transaction costs as a fraction ½1
of its selling value and ½2 of its buying value.
3.4.3 Borrowing constraints
I assume that only collateralized credit is available and that the borrowing interest rate,
mortgage interest rate and deposit interest rate are all equal. This implies that mortgages
and deposits are perfect substitutes. I use at to denote the net asset position. To buy a
house household must satisfy a minimum down payment requirement as a fraction µ of the
value of house. Housings also serves as collateral for loans (through home equity loans or
re¯nancing) up to a fraction (1 ¡ µ). At any given period household's ¯nancial assets must
hence satisfy:
(5) a0 ¸ ¡(1 ¡ µ)h0;
and household's net worth is thus always non-negative. Notice in this case, a household's net
worth is bounded below by a fraction µ of the value of house4.
4For a household without a house, the borrowing constraint reduces to the standard form a ¸ 0:
133.4.4 Labor productivity
In this economy all agents of the same age face the same exogenous age-e±ciency pro¯le ²t.
This pro¯le is estimated from the data and recovers the fact that productive ability changes
over the life cycle. Workers also face stochastic shocks to their productivity level. These
shocks are represented by a Markov process de¯ned on (Y ;B(Y )) and characterized by a
transition function Qy, where Y ½ R++ and B(Y ) is the Borel algebra on Y . This Markov
process is the same for all households. This implies that there is no aggregate uncertainty
over the aggregate labor endowment although there is uncertainty at the individual level.
The total productivity of a worker of age t is given by the product of the worker's stochastic
productivity in that period and the worker's deterministic e±ciency index at the same age:
yt²t.
To capture the positive correlation in human capital across generations, I assume that
the parent's productivity shock at age 50 is transmitted to children at age 20 according to a
transition function Qyh, de¯ned on (Y ;B(Y )). What the children inherit is only their ¯rst
draw; from age 20 on, their productivity yt evolves stochastically according to Qy.
For computational reasons, I assume that children cannot observe directly their parent's
assets, but only their parent's productivity when their parent is 50 and the children are 20,
that is, the period when they leave the house and start working5. Based on this information,
children infer the size of the bequests they are likely to receive.
3.4.5 The household's recursive problem
In the stationary equilibrium, the household's state variables are given by (t;a;h;y;yp); the
¯rst 4 variables of which denote the agent's age, ¯nancial assets and housing stock carried
from the previous period and the agent's productivity, respectively. The last term yp denotes
the value of the agent's parent's productivity at age 50 until the agent inherits and zero
thereafter. The law of motion of yp is dictated by the death probability of the parent.
When yp is positive, it is used to compute the probability distribution on bequests that the
household expects from the parent. When the agents have already inherited, yp is set to be
0.
According to the demographic transitions, there are four cases.
(i) From t = 1 to t = 3 (from age 20 to 35), the agent survives with certainty until next
period and does not expect to receive a bequest soon because his or her parent is younger
than 65. For these sub periods yp0 = yp.
(6) V (t;a;h;y;yp) = max
c;a0;h0
n
U(c;h) + ¯E(V (t + 1;a0;h0;y0;yp))
o
5For example, allowing children to observe parents productivity at two periods adds one more state variable
and also increases substantially the time needed to iterate over the bequest distributions. Since income in the
calibration is very persistent, an observation of one year of income is likely to be not much less informative
than two.
14subject to (5) and
c + a0 + h0 + ¿(h0;h) = (1 ¡ ¿l)w² + (1 + r)a + (1 ¡ ±h)h; (7)
c ¸ 0; h0 ¸ 0: (8)
At any subperiod, the agent's resources are derived from asset holdings, a, labor endow-
ment, ²ty housing stock holding, h. Asset holdings pay a risk-free rate r and labor receives a
real wage w. Houses depreciate at rate ±h. The evolution of y is described by the transition
function Qy: Government taxes labor income at the rate ¿l:
(ii) From t = 4 to t = 6 (from age 35 to 50), the worker survives for sure until the next
period. However, the agent's parent is at least 65 years old and faces a positive probability of
dying at any period; hence, a bequest might be received at the beginning of the next period.
The conditional distribution of bequest a person of state x expects in case of parental death
is denoted by ¹b(x;:). In equilibrium this distribution must be consistent with the parent's
behavior. Since the evolution of the state variable yp is dictated by the death process of the
parent, yp0 jumps to zero with probability 1 ¡ pt+6. Let Iyp>0 be the indicator function for
yp > 0; it is one if yp > 0 and zero otherwise.
(9) V (t;a;h;y;yp) = max
c;e a;h0
n
U(c;h) + ¯E(V (t + 1;a0;h0;y0;yp0))
o
subject to (5), (8), and
c + e a + h0 + ¿(h0;h) = (1 ¡ ¿l)w² + (1 + r)a + (1 ¡ ±h)h;
a0 = e a + b0Iyp>0Iyp0=0; (10)
where e a denotes the ¯nancial assets at the end of the period before receiving bequest.
(iii) The subperiods t = 7 to t = 9 (from age 50 to 65) is the periods before retirement,
during which no more inheritances are expected because the agent's parent is already dead
by that time. Thus yp is not in the state space any more. The agent does not face any
survival uncertainty.
(11) V (t;a;h;y) = max
c;a0;h0
n
U(c;h) + ¯E(V (t + 1;a0;h0;y0))
o
subject to (5), (7) and (8).
(iv) From t = 10 to t = 12 (from age 65 to 80), the agent does not work and does not
inherit any more, but faces a positive probability of dying. Let pt denote the conditional
survival probability at age t. In case of death, the agent derives utility from bequeathing his
or her assets. When the agent dies, the house is sold automatically and transaction costs are
15incurred6.
(12) V (t;a;h) = max
c;a0;h0
n
U(c;h) + ¯pt(V (t + 1;a0;h0)) + (1 ¡ pt)Á(b)
o
subject to (5), (8) and
c + a0 + h0 + ¿(h0;h) = (1 + r)a + (1 ¡ ±h)h + P;
(13) b = a0 + h0 ¡ ¿(h0;0):
Households receive pension income P: For simplicity, I assume the pension level is inde-
pendent of household's income history7.
4 Calibration
I choose some parameters used in the benchmark model from estimations by other studies.
The remaining parameters are chosen so that the model generated data match a given set of
targets. Since one period in my model corresponds to 5 years in real life, I adjust parameters
accordingly.
The rate of population growth, n, is set to the average population growth from 1950 to
1997 from Economic Report of the President (1998). The pt's are the vectors of conditional
survival probabilities for people older than 65. I use the mortality probabilities of people
born in 1965 provided by Bell, Wade, and Goss (1992).
I construct measures of output Y , capital K and housing H and their investment coun-
terparts according to my model. I use data from the National Income and Product Accounts
and the Fixed Assets Tables both from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the year 1954-
1999. The aggregate ratios for US economy are calibrated to explicitly consider the existence
of housing that comprises residential assets. Output is de¯ned as measured GDP minus
housing services. Capital is de¯ned as the sum of nonresidential private and government
¯xed assets plus the stock of inventories. Investment in capital, I is de¯ned accordingly. The
housing stock is de¯ned as the stock of private residential assets. Investment in housing, Ih;
is constructed accordingly. The term ® is the share of income that goes to capital, which
I turns out to be 0.226. This capital share (non residential stock of capital) is much lower
than that in other calibrations, which abstract from housing. The rate r is the interest rate
on capital net of depreciation. I calibrate ±k to be 0.0700 and ±h to be 0.0294. Given the
calibration for the US production function, this interest rate is endogenous, and turns out to
6I made this simpli¯cation since the children already have houses of their own when they inherit.
7A more realistic assumption is that social security bene¯t is a concave function of the accumulated
contribution. Under this assumption, the accumulated contribution becomes a state variable, which increases
the computation time dramatically.
16be 4.37%. Appendix 8.5 explains the rationale behind these choices in greater detail.
The deterministic age-pro¯le of the unconditional mean of labor productivity, ²t; is taken
from Hansen (1993). Since I impose mandatory retirement at the age of 65, I take ²t = 0 for
t > 9. The stochastic productivity process is assumed to be an AR(1) process:
lnyt = ½y lnyt¡1 + ¹t ¹t v N(0;¾2
y).
The persistence ½y and variance ¾2
y are estimated from Panel Study on Income Dynamics
(PSID) data, aggregated over ¯ve years in order to be consistent with the model period
(Altonji and Villanueva (2002)). The parent's productivity shock at age 50 is transmitted to
children at age 20 according to the following transition function:
lny1 = ½yh lnyh;7 + º1; º1 s N(0;¾2
yh).
I take ½yh from Zimmerman (1992), and choose ¾2
yh to match the Gini coe±cient of 0.44 for
earnings.
The down payment ratio µ is set to be 0.2, which is commonly used in housing literature.
Recently some households are allowed to purchase houses without much initial wealth. How-
ever, Caplin et al. (1997) argue that \it is almost impossible for a household to purchase a
home without available liquid assets of at least 10% of the home's value". In addition, what
is crucial for my model is the assumption that young and poor household can not borrow
beyond the liquidation value of their collateral. Thus I choose a higher down payment ratio
despite the recent decline of down payment ratio. I see the e®ect of down payment ratio in
Section 6.
Since one of my main interest is to look at how transaction costs a®ect consumption
and saving decisions, one key calibration is the type of transaction costs that I choose.
Smith, Rosen and Fallis (1988) estimate the transaction costs of changing houses, including
searching, legal costs, cost of readjusting home, and psychological costs from disruption.
Their estimation is approximately 8-10 percentage the unit being changed. Martin (2002)
¯nds that the monetary costs of buying a new home, which include agent fee, transfer fee,
appraisal and inspection fee, range on average from 7 to 11 percent of purchase price of a
home. Gruber and Martin (2003) estimate the reallocation cost of tax and agency costs from
CEX and ¯nd the median household pays costs of the order of 7 percent to sell their houses
and 2.5 percent to purchase. In my simulation, I choose transaction costs from sale to be
½1 = 6%; and transaction costs from purchase to be ½2 = 2%: These values are lower than
the transaction costs reported above therefore they serve as a lower bound of the e®ect of
transaction costs. I set ¹1 = ¹2 = 0. That is to say, if the value of the housing stock increases
or decreases, I assume that the house has been sold.
The social security income P is chosen to be 40% of the average household after tax
earnings, a number commonly used in the social security literature. The labor income tax ¿l
17is chosen to balance government budget.
I take risk aversion parameter, ´, to be 1.5, from Attanasio et al. (1999) and Gourinchas
and Parker (2002), who estimate it from consumption data. This value is in the commonly
used range (1-5) in the literature. ¾ governs the elasticity of substitution between housing
and non-housing. Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) use aggregate data and a similar speci¯cation,
and obtain an estimated ¾ = 0:145, not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. I thus choose ¾ to
be 0 so that the momentary utility function g(c;h) takes the Cobb-Douglas form8. I see the
e®ect of elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing in Section 6.
I choose the discount factor, ¯; to match the capital-output ratio. The parameter !
determines the share of consumption allocated to the non-housing consumption goods and
is set to match the ratio of non-housing expenditure to housing stock. I use Á1 to match
bequest output ratio of 2.65% in the US simulation (Gale and Scholz (1994))9. Á2 is chosen to
match the ratio of average bequest left by single decedents at the lowest 80th percentile over
average household earnings. According to Hurd and Smith (2001), the average bequest left
by single decedents at the lowest 80th percentile was $125,000 (Asset and Health Dynamics
Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data sets, 1993-95).
5 Numerical Results
The benchmark economy allows for housing transaction costs and ¹1 = ¹2 = 0. That is
to say, if the value of the housing stock increases or decreases, I assume that the house has
been sold. In this case, the household has to pay the transaction costs as a fraction ½1 = 6%
of its selling value and ½2 = 2% of its buying value. Some parameters are set so that the
model-generated data match a given set of targets (see Section 4). Appendix 8.6 describes
the computation algorithm in greater detail.
5.1 Life cycle pro¯les
Now I show the average life cycle pro¯les of ¯nancial assets, total net worth, non-housing
consumption and housing consumption. All ¯gures are normalized by the average household
earnings. These averages are obtained by integrating the policy function with respect to
the equilibrium measure of agents, holding age ¯xed. For example, the average housing
consumption by an agent at age t is given by
H =
R
h(t;a;h;y;yp)m¤(ftg £ da £ dh £ dy £ dyp) R
m¤(ftg £ da £ dh £ dy £ dyp)
Figure 10 compares the average life cycle pro¯les of annual non-housing consumption and
8In this case I add a positive number " so that utility function is well de¯ned at h = 0: The term " is small
enough that it does not a®ect the results. The utility function takes form g(c;h) = c
!(h + ")
1¡!
9Since in my model output corresponds to GDP minus housing service, I adjust it accordingly.
18Parameters Calibrations
Demographics
n population growth 1.2%
pt survival probability see text
Technology
® capital share in National Income 0:226
±k depreciation rate of capital 0:0700
±h depreciation rate of housing 0:0294
Endowment
²t age-e±ciency pro¯le see text
½y AR(1) coe±cient of income process 0:85
¾2
y innovation of income process 0:30
½yh AR(1) coe±cient of income inheritance process 0:677
¾2
yh innovation of income inheritance process 0:37
Government policy
¿l social security tax 0:07
P social security replacement rate 0:40
Housing market
µ down payment ratio 0:20
½1 transaction costs of selling housing 6%
½2 transaction costs of buying housing 2%
¹1 Maximum depreciation 0
¹2 Maximum renovation 0
Preference
´ risk aversion coe±cient 1:5
¾ substitutability of housing and non-housing 0
! weights of non-housing in utility function 0:8615
¯ discount factor 0:946
Á1 weight of bequest in utility function ¡17
Á2 shifter of bequest in utility function 8
Table 2: Parameters used in the benchmark model
19housing consumption in the model with those in the data reported in Figure 3 and Figure
4. I adjust the data so that aggregate non-housing consumption is the same in the data
as in the model10, and aggregate housing stock is the same in the data as in the model.
From Figure 10, we see the hump shape of average non-housing consumption, which peaks
at age 50's. The non-housing consumption at age 50 is 80% more than that of age 20, which
is similar to the pattern reported in the data. After the peak, non-housing consumption
decreases steadily with age. The non-housing consumption at age 50 is 25% more than that
of age 75. Facing an increasing future income pro¯le, young agents would like to borrow to
¯nance their current consumption but they are borrowing constrained. This explains why
early in life consumption path increases as income path does. As households age, they start
to decrease their non-housing consumption due to the fact that time preference is higher than
the interest rate and mortality rates are increasing along the life cycle. Compared with data,
the non-housing consumption is lower between age 20-35. This may be due to the abstraction
of inter-vivos transfers or housing rental market in the model. Inter-vivos transfer relaxes
borrowing constraints, while a housing rental market allows young households to have high
non-housing consumption while renting. For detailed discussions of the implications of those
two limitations, see Section 7.




















































Figure 10: Life cycle patterns of consumption (benchmark)
The housing consumption pro¯le in the model reproduces the empirically observed in-
creasing early in life and slow downsizing later in life. Agents build their housing stock early
in life and compromise on non-housing consumption. Agents build up their highest housing
stock at the age of 60, 5 years later than the peak of non-housing consumption. The elderly
do not decrease their housing stock later in life.
The model also generate the pattern that the ratio of housing to non-housing consumption
10In the model I match the aggregate consumption with this in the NIPA. Compared with NIPA, CEX
underreports consumption by a fraction of 30% (see Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2004) for detailed
discussion). Thus I adjust for the di®erence accordingly.














































Figure 11: Ratio of housing to non-housing consumption (benchmark)
increases over the life-cycle. Figure 11 compares this ratio in the model and in the data. Early
in life, the ratio of housing to non-housing is higher than that in the data. This is because
in the model non-housing consumption is lower than that in the data. Later in life, the ratio
of housing to non-housing is lower than that in the data. This is because in the model non-
housing consumption is higher than in the data. A parsimonious model without borrowing
constraints and transaction costs in trading houses implies a constant ratio of housing to non-
housing consumption, which is equal to H
C . If we denote the di®erence in the ratio between
the data and the parsimonious model without borrowing constraints and transaction costs



















 Policy function of housing at 70
Non−housing asset
Figure 12: Policy function of housing stock next period for a 70-year-old
The introduction of transaction costs forces agents to reduce the frequency of transactions
in the housing market. Agents make no change to the stock of the housing unless their non-
housing assets and housing stocks are too unbalanced. Two retired agents with the same
housing stock, age and di®erent holding of non-housing assets may choose the same level
21of housing stock next period, as long as the di®erence of non-housing assets is not large.
Given current housing stock, there is a wide range of non-housing assets that households do
not adjust for their housing stock. The size of the inactive region is di®erent according to
agents age and income and also is a®ected by parameters such as the size of the transaction
costs. Figure 12 shows the policy function of housing next period as a function of current
holding of non-housing and housing stock for a 70-year-old agent. Even for relatively small
transaction costs, the inactive region is quite large. The inactive region can be de¯ned by
two boundaries, (al(h); ah(h)): If a household with a housing stock of h holds non-housing
assets more than the upper boundary ah(h); the household will move to a bigger house next
period and hold a smaller fraction of non-housing assets in the wealth portfolio. If instead
he/she holds non-housing assets less than the lower boundary al(h); the household will move
to a smaller house next period and hold a larger fraction of non-housing assets in the wealth
portfolio. Figure 13 shows the boundaries of the inactive region on the plane of current
holding of non-housing and housing stock for a 70-year-old agent and a 65-year-old agent,
respectively. One reason that the inactive region for a 65-year-old agent is smaller than a
70-year-old agent is because a 65-year-old agent has a longer life expectancy which increases
the bene¯t of changing the housing stock. Since bequest is modeled as luxury goods, the
utility function is not homothetic. Thus the policy functions are not necessarily homogeneous
and the boundaries are not strict lines.




























Figure 13: Boundaries of inactive zones
Now we go beyond mean consumption and look at the distribution of consumption in
the benchmark economy . Figure 14 plots non-housing consumption at the mean level and
at each quartile. W e observe that the non-housing consumption is hump-shaped at each
quartile. The benchmark economy also generates the skewed distribution of consumption at
each age group, as is observed in the data.
Figure 15 plots housing consumption at the mean level and at each quartile. The bench-
mark economy generates the increasing of housing stock early in life and the °at portion later







































Figure 14: Non-housing consumption (quartiles)
in life at each quartile. The benchmark economy also generates the skewed distribution of
housing consumption at each age group, as is observed in the data.



























Figure 15: Housing consumption (quartiles)
The existence of transaction costs a®ects young agents and old agents di®erently . Y oung
households face increasing income pro¯les and would like to purchase large houses but they
have to accumulate enough non-housing assets to pay the down payment. As a result, they
have to increase their housing stock fairly often. As the households age and their income
pro¯le stabilize, households would keep their level of housing stock unchanged, giving that
trading of housing stock would incur transaction costs. Old households are less likely to move
than young household, since they could only consume the new house for a relatively short
period of time. Figure 16 shows the fraction of households moving at the end of each period
for each age group. Moving rates by age in the data is taken from Schachter (2001) and are
aggregated to ¯ve years. W e see moving rates decline with age in the model, as in the data.
Moving rates in the data is higher than in the model. One reason is that renters are also
















Figure 16: Moving rates by age
included in calculating the moving rates, and renters tend to move much more frequently than
homeowners. The other reason is, households move for reasons other than income shocks and
aging that this model abstracts from.













































Figure 17: Life cycle patterns of wealth composition
Figure 17 displays the evolution of wealth portfolio over the life cycle. Y oung agents
tend to hold little wealth. They start with zero wealth and they expect to have much higher
earnings in the future. Thus to smooth consumption, they do not hold much wealth. Early
in life households borrow as much as possible to buy houses, and thus save in the form of
housing. As time goes by , agents have built stocks of houses and start to increase their
holding of ¯nancial assets. The pro¯le of ¯nancial assets and housing assets intersect in
their early 40's, as is observed in the data. The wealth holding peaks at age 65, the year
before retirement. After retirement, they start to dissave assets to ¯nance consumption. Old
agents discount their future consumption at a higher rate since the survival probabilities are
declining in age. This implies that the consumption pro¯le is declining later in life and hence
24little wealth is needed to ¯nance consumption later in life. Compared with data reported
in Figure 8, the wealth pro¯le and assets pro¯le have humps that are more pronounced.
Since I abstract from health expenditure uncertainty or other shocks that could motivate
precautionary assets holding in old age, old agents do not have precautionary saving motives
as they do in the data, therefore they run down their assets more quickly than in the data.
5.2 Wealth distribution
Table 3 reports values for the wealth distribution for my benchmark economy. I present
quintile shares, the 90-95%, the 95-99%, the top 1% shares and Gini coe±cient for net worth,
housing stocks and ¯nancial assets. US wealth distribution is calculated using 1998 SCF. In
the data wealth is highly unevenly distributed with a Gini coe±cient of 0.80. The top 1% of
the households hold 34% of the total wealth and the 95-99% of the households hold 24% of
the total wealth. Housing is more evenly distributed than net worth with a Gini coe±cient
of 0.63. The top 1% of the households hold 11% of the total housing wealth and the 95-99%
of the households hold 17% of the total housing wealth. Financial asset is more unevenly
distributed than net worth with a Gini coe±cient of 0.99. The top 1% of the households hold
46% of the total ¯nancial wealth and the 95-99% of the households hold 28% of the total
¯nancial wealth11.
The benchmark model matches the distribution of wealth, housing and ¯nancial wealth
quite well, with the exception of top 1%. It also replicates the empirical ¯nding that inequality
in ¯nancial assets is much higher than housing. This is because households are allowed to
borrow against housing so ¯nancial assets can be negative but the housing stock can not
be. Also for households that are not borrowing constrained, the return of housing, marginal
utility of housing, is decreasing, while the return to ¯nancial assets, the interest rate, is
constant. Thus housing as the fraction of net worth is decreasing.
5.3 Bequest distribution
Figure 18 compares the cumulative distribution of estate among the whole economy at any
given time implied by the model with the data. The US data on the estate distribution
is from Hurd and Smith (2001) who use the AHEAD data exit interview of 771 deceased
between 1993-199512. The size distribution of the bequest is very concentrated both in the
data and in the model: 30% of the deceased AHEAD respondents had an estate of no value13.
11All Gini coe±cients are calculated without replacing the negative numbers with zeros. If I replace the
negative numbers with zeros, then the Gini coe±cients become slightly smaller
12I use distribution for single decedents. Using the bequest left by singles rather than the one for all
decedents (which turns out to be 1-2 times bigger) is a more sensible choice because typically a surviving
spouse inherits a large share of the estate, which will be partly consumed before ¯nally being left to the
couple's children.
1330% households report leaving no bequest in AHEAD but 70% households report receiving no inheritance
in SCF and PSID. One reason is that estates are often divided among several children.
25Gini 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100
Total wealth
U.S. data 0.80 -0.28 1.35 5.14 13.00 81.59 11.48 23.72 33.65
Model 0.74 0.13 0.67 4.04 17.35 77.81 19.91 25.12 10.00
Housing
US data 0.63 0 1.09 13.66 24.10 61.15 13.87 17.12 11.32
Model 0.48 1.73 8.39 14.71 24.59 50.58 13.02 11.79 3.74
Financial wealth
US data 0.99 -6.00 -0.12 1.26 7.23 97.64 11.98 28.20 46.35
Model 0.86 -6.07 -2.68 -0.29 12.32 96.71 24.51 33.70 14.07
Table 3: Wealth distribution
The mean estate was $104,500 but the median was much lower ($62,200). Some respondents
leave relatively large estates: 30% are $120,000 or more and 5% are in excess of $300,000.
Only 3% of the estates were valued at $600,000 or more. One parameter of the model is
chosen so that the two distributions match at one point: the 80th percentile. The estate
distribution generated by the model actually matches very well to the AHEAD data until
the 80th percentile of the estate distribution. From that point on, the model predicts larger
bequests than those observed in the AHEAD data. The discrepancy is partly due to the fact
that AHEAD misses some large estates.














Figure 18: Cumulative distribution of bequest
Figure 19 shows the bequest distribution for a 35-year-old person conditional on his/her
parent's observed productivity level. At that age, the probabilities of receiving bequests less
than 2 times output per capita are, respectively , 71%, 19%, 1% and 0%, for people with
parents in the lowest, second lowest, second highest and highest productivity levels. Even in
the presence of bequest motives, most of the parents run down their assets after retirement.
















Figure 19: Expected bequest distribution at age 35, conditional on parent's productivity
The fraction of people whose parents live up to the ¯nal age of the model economy and who
do not receive a positive bequest are, respectively, 99%, 98%, 88% and 23%, for people with
parents in the lowest, second lowest, second highest and highest productivity levels.
6 Decomposition
While the benchmark model does a good job in generating the di®erent patterns of housing
and non-housing consumption, and the evolution of assets composition, let us now try to
understand how each ingredient a®ects the results. I change one parameter at a time, keeping
other parameters as in the benchmark economy. This comparison can shed light on what
role each feature of the model plays in generating the consumption and assets accumulation
pro¯les.
First, I change the transaction costs. Then I change the remodeling-maintenance option.
I further change parameters that govern the bequest motives. Then I check the e®ect of
down payment ratio. I also change the elasticity of substitution between the housing and
the non-housing consumption. Finally I study the e®ect of the pay-as-you-go social security
system.
6.1 Transaction cost
Now I investigate the e®ects of transaction costs on household consumption and asset hold-
ing in this subsection by setting costs to 0. In Figure 20, we see the hump shape of the
average non-housing consumption, which is similar to the one reported in the data and in the
benchmark model. Compared with the benchmark case, a model without transaction costs
generates a hump-shaped non-housing consumption pro¯le but the decrease of housing stock
later in life is too fast.
Figure 21 compares the ratio of housing to non-housing consumption in the model with























Figure 20: Life cycle patterns of consumption (no transaction costs: ½1 = ½2 = 0%)
and without transaction costs. Without transaction costs, the ratio becomes °atter over the
life cycle. The ratio is increasing early in life because of the existence of borrowing constraints.
Later in life when borrowing constraints are less likely to be binding, a model without trans-
action costs implies a °at pattern of the ratio of housing to non-housing consumption. These
results show that borrowing constraints are essential in explaining the accumulation of hous-
ing assets early in life, while the transaction costs play an important role in explaining the
slow decline of housing consumption later in life.

































Figure 21: Ratio of housing to non-housing consumption (no transaction costs: ½1 = ½2 = 0%)
Figure 22 shows the average life cycle pro¯les of ¯nancial assets and total net worth. The
evolution of the wealth portfolio over the life cycle is similar to the one in the benchmark
case. The holding of ¯nancial assets is lower than the benchmark. This is because without
transaction costs, housing assets become more attractive than ¯nancial assets. Therefore a
household's portfolio shifts from ¯nancial assets to housing assets.
Figure 23 shows the e®ect of low transaction costs on average non-housing and housing
consumption, when I set ½1 = 3% and ½2 = 1%, half as in the benchmark economy. The



















Figure 22: Life cycle patterns of wealth composition (no transaction costs: ½1 = ½2 = 0%)






















Figure 23: Life cycle patterns of consump-
tion (high transaction costs: ½1 = 3%,
½2 = 1% )



















Figure 24: Life cycle patterns of wealth
composition (high transaction costs: ½1 =
3%, ½2 = 1% )
housing consumption is higher than that in the benchmark. This is because when transaction
costs are lower, housing assets become more attractive than ¯nancial assets. We also see
that when the transaction costs are lower, housing consumption declines slightly after age
60. Figure 24 shows that the e®ect of low transaction costs on net worth pro¯le is small.
Figure 25 shows the e®ect of high transaction costs on average non-housing and housing
consumption, when I set ½1 = 8% and ½2 = 2%. The housing consumption is lower than that
in the benchmark. This is because when transaction costs are higher, housing assets become
less attractive than ¯nancial assets. Figure 26 shows that the e®ect of high transaction costs
on net worth pro¯le is small.
6.2 Remodeling-maintenance option
Now I give agents the remodeling-maintenance option. I set ¹1 = ¹2 = 15% (which is equal
to the depreciation rate in 5 years). That is to say, households are allowed to change their






















Figure 25: Life cycle patterns of consump-
tion (high transaction costs: ½1 = 8%,
½2 = 2% )



















Figure 26: Life cycle patterns of wealth
composition (high transaction costs: ½1 =
8%, ½2 = 2% )
level of housing consumption by allowing depreciation up to 15% the value of the house or
by undertaking housing renovation up to a fraction of 15% the value of the house as an
alternative to moving.






















Figure 27: Life cycle patterns of con-
sumption (remodeling-maintenance op-
tion: ¹1 = ¹2 = 15%)



















Figure 28: Life cycle patterns of wealth
composition (remodeling-maintenance
option: ¹1 = ¹2 = 15%)
From Figure 27, we see the same hump-shaped non-housing consumption pro¯le. Housing
stock is slightly higher than the benchmark model between age 25-35. This shows that
most households would rather upsize their housing stock a lot therefore the remodeling-
maintenance option has little e®ect. Only when at the last period, we see elderly households
take the advantage of this option and allow the house to depreciate.
Figure 28 shows the average life cycle pro¯les of ¯nancial assets and total net worth.
The evolution of the wealth portfolio over the life cycle is almost identical to the one in the
benchmark case.
306.3 Bequest motive
Now I present the results from a model without voluntary bequest motives by setting Á1 = 0:
This modi¯cation removes a saving motive thus the aggregate capital stock and output
are lower than in the benchmark economy. Figure 29 compares the average non-housing
and housing consumption in the case of no bequest motives and in the benchmark case.
Compared with the benchmark case, the pro¯les of housing and non-housing consumption
have the similar shape, but the consumption of non-housing goods and housing is lower from
age 45 and on. The reason is households are now receiving accidental bequest, which is
much smaller than in the benchmark economy with bequest motives, therefore they have less
resources to support consumption after middle age. The bequest motives are not the key
factor explaining the slow downsizing of housing stock later in life for the average household.
The intuition here is that the household faces transaction costs to downsize his/her housing
stock, but can run down his/her ¯nancial assets without any costs. Without bequest motives,
he/she chooses to run down his/her net worth completely by the time he/she expects to be
dead for sure. Thus it is optimal to do so by running down his/her ¯nancial assets, rather
than by trading the large house he/she lives in to a smaller one, and thus paying large
transaction costs in the process14.






















Figure 29: Life cycle patterns of consump-
tion (no bequest motives: Á1=0)



















Figure 30: Life cycle patterns of wealth
composition (no bequest motives: Á1=0)
Figure 30 compares the average life cycle pro¯les of ¯nancial assets and total net worth in
the case of no bequest motives and in the benchmark case. Compared with the benchmark
case, the pro¯les of ¯nancial assets and total net worth is much lower from age 45. The
reason is that accidental bequest received is much smaller than in the benchmark economy.
The bequest motives, therefore, play an important role in determining total life time wealth
14In the model, mortgages and deposits are perfect substitutes therefore the net mortgage position is inde-
terminant. The fact that households run down their ¯nancial assets does not necessary mean that households
are borrowing against their houses using reverse mortgage products. The fraction of households aged 65 and
above who hold wealth more than the value of the house are still pretty high, around 70% in the benchmark
economy, and 67% in the case without bequest motive.
31and ¯nancial assets.






















Figure 31: Life cycle patterns of consump-
tion (high bequest motives: Á1=-22)




















Figure 32: Life cycle patterns of wealth
composition (high bequest motives: Á1=-
22)
Since the bequest-output ratio reported in Gale and Scholz (1994) is a low estimate of
the magnitude of the bequest motives, I present the results from a model with stronger
voluntary bequest motives by setting Á1 = ¡22: A stronger bequest motive increases the
aggregate capital stock and output. Figures 31 and 32 show the average life cycle pro¯les
of ¯nancial assets and total net worth, non-housing consumption and housing consumption.
Compared with the benchmark case, the consumption of non-housing goods and housing is
higher from age 45, the pro¯les of ¯nancial assets and total net worth is much higher from
age 45. The bequest motives, therefore, play an important role in determining total life time
wealth and ¯nancial assets.
6.4 Down payment
Now I check the e®ect of the borrowing constraints on consumption paths and wealth paths
by changing down payment ratio. The down payment ratio does a®ect the consumption of
housing and non-housing when the households are young. If the down payment ratio is low,
then young households are more likely to move into big houses, therefore the housing pro¯le
increases quickly. Figure 33 and Figure 34 show the average life cycle pro¯les of assets and
consumption paths when the down payment ratio is 0. Compared with the benchmark, the
consumption of housing goods is higher early in life. The pro¯les of wealth and consumption
are similar to these in the benchmark economy for middle and old households, indicating that
most of them are not constrained by the down payment requirement. Households use houses
as collateral and they have negative ¯nancial wealth until their forties, a point at which they
begin to save for retirement. This indicates that saving for purchasing houses is the main
saving motive for young households.
On the contrary, when the down payment ratio is high, young households have to wait






















Figure 33: Life cycle patterns of consump-
tion (no down payment: µ=0)



















Figure 34: Life cycle patterns of wealth
composition (no down payment: µ=0)
longer to accumulate more ¯nancial assets to pay higher down payments. Figure 35 and
Figure 36 show the average life cycle pro¯les of assets and consumption paths when the
down payment ratio is 0.4. Compared with the benchmark, the consumption of houses is
lower early in life. Higher down payment ratio implies tighter borrowing constraints, therefore
young households could not borrow as much as in the benchmark economy and have higher
¯nancial assets and higher net worth in this case.






















Figure 35: Life cycle patterns of consump-
tion (high down payment: µ=0.4)



















Figure 36: Life cycle patterns of wealth
composition (high down payment: µ=0.4)
6.5 Elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing consump-
tion
In this subsection we will see the e®ect of the elasticity of substitution between the housing
and non-housing consumption. Figure 37 and Figure 38 compare the average life cycle pro¯les
of assets and consumption paths when the elasticity of substitution between the housing and
non-housing consumption is 0:83 (¾ = ¡0:2) with the benchmark case. We still see the hump-
33shaped non-housing consumption and the non-hump-shaped housing consumption. Housing
consumption is higher than in the benchmark. In the extreme case where housing and non-
housing are perfect complements (¾ = ¡1), agents would like to consume non-housing
goods and housing goods in the same proportion therefore they accumulate housing assets
faster. This explains why the accumulation of housing is faster when the elasticity is lower.
Transaction costs for trading houses still prevent households from downsizing houses later
in life, even when the elasticity is lower and households want to keep the consumption of
housing and non-housing in the same proportion.























Figure 37: Life cycle patterns of consump-
tion (low elasticity: ¾=-0.2)



















Figure 38: Life cycle patterns of wealth
composition (low elasticity: ¾=-0.2)






















Figure 39: Life cycle patterns of consump-
tion (high elasticity: ¾=0.2)



















Figure 40: Life cycle patterns of wealth
composition (high elasticity: ¾=0.2)
Figure 39 and Figure 40 compare the average life cycle pro¯les of assets and consumption
paths when the elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing is 1.25 (¾ =
0:2) with the benchmark case. We still see the hump-shaped non-housing consumption and
the non-hump-shaped housing consumption. When the elasticity of substitution is high,
households could substitute more easily between non-housing and housing goods, thus they
34shift consumption from housing to non-housing. In the extreme case where housing and
non-housing are perfect substitutes (¾ = 1), agents will consume non-housing goods but no
housing goods. This is because the net worth is bounded below by fraction µ of the value
of houses, thus a bigger house implies a tighter borrowing constraint. This explains why
the accumulation of housing is slower when the elasticity is high. When the elasticity of
substitution is high, households are less willing to pay transaction costs to adjust housing
consumption later in life. Thus transaction costs for trading houses prevent households from
downsizing houses later in life.
6.6 Pay-as-you-go social security system
Now I look at an economy without a pay-as-you-go social security system. This modi¯cation
strengthens saving for retirement, thus the aggregate capital stock and output are higher than
in the benchmark economy. If I abandon a pay-as-you-go system in which the government
taxes working agents and provides social security to retired agents, then young agents are less
likely to be borrowing constrained, making the average non-housing and housing consumption
increasing faster early in life. Also abandoning a pension system decreases the hump of wealth
pro¯le. Figure 41 shows the average life cycle pro¯les of consumption paths. We observe
that the shapes of housing and non-housing consumption are similar as in the benchmark
economy. The higher level of consumption is caused by the abandonment of social security
tax which leaves agents more resources to consume.






















Figure 41: Life cycle patterns of consump-
tion (no social security: P=0)





















Figure 42: Life cycle patterns of wealth
composition (no social security: P=0)
Figure 42 shows the average life cycle pro¯les of assets when there is no pay-as-you-go
social security system. Abandoning a social security system encourages private saving for
retirement, thus wealth since the middle age, is much higher than in the benchmark case,
and we see much more pronounced humps in wealth and ¯nancial asset pro¯les.
357 Conclusions
This paper investigates the degree to which several modi¯cations of the basic life cycle model
produce consumption pro¯les of housing and non-housing that more closely resemble features
of the US. To do this, I develop a quantitative and realistically calibrated dynamic general
equilibrium model to solve numerically for the optimal housing and non-housing consumption
decisions for a ¯nitely-lived individual who faces several market frictions. One rational for
using dynamic general equilibrium framework is that dynamic general equilibrium models
are important tools for economic policy evaluation. Furthermore, in this dynamic general
equilibrium framework, the time preference and the interest rate, which greatly a®ect the
intertemporal consumption smoothing and thus the consumption pro¯les, can be jointly
calibrated without having to match the consumption pro¯les.
The model is able to match two basic patterns observed in the data: the hump-shaped
non-housing consumption pro¯le and non-hump-shaped housing consumption pro¯le. House-
holds begin their economic lives without any housing stock. During the early part of their
lives, they are forced to build housing stock and compromise on non-housing consumption.
As households age, they start to decrease their non-housing consumption due to the fact
that the time preference is higher than the interest rate and mortality rates are increasing
along the life cycle. The high transaction costs for trading houses prevent households from
decreasing their housing stock quickly later in life.
The model is also able to capture the life cycle wealth portfolio pro¯les. In the US, young
households virtually own no liquid ¯nancial assets, but hold a major fraction of their wealth
as housing. Later in life, households shift their portfolios to ¯nancial assets.
I also investigate the quantitative relevance of the transaction costs, borrowing constraints
and bequest motives in determining this pattern. I ¯nd that while borrowing constraints
are essential in explaining the accumulation of housing assets early in life, the existence of
transaction costs is crucial in explaining the slow downsizing of housing pro¯le later in life.
The bequest motives play a role in determining total lifetime wealth, but not the housing
pro¯le.
In this paper I have abstracted from some important issues in order to make the model
manageable and solvable. Now I discuss these simpli¯cations and their likely quantitative
implications.
One important assumption is that there are no inter-vivos transfers. In the data, parents
tend to give children money when they need money the most, although data from Health and
Retirement Study suggests that these transfers are fairly small (see Cardia and Ng (2000)).
This assumption is probably relevant when agents are 20 to 35 years of age. Allowing for
inter-vivos transfers would make young households have higher housing and non-housing
consumption.
In order to simplify the computation, I do not adopt the literature using endogenous bor-
36rowing constraints. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2001) compare the life cycle pro¯les
in a model with endogenous borrowing constraints with the exogenous constraints as in this
model and they show that the life cycle pro¯les are identical across these two economies. The
major di®erence between the two economies is that with endogenous borrowing constraints
the net worth of the average young agents is slightly negative, indicating young agents are
borrowing to ¯nance the accumulation of housing and to smooth consumption over time and
states. Since I focus on the consumption patterns later in life, I abstract from the endogeneity
of borrowing constraints.
Another important assumption that I make is that there is no housing rental market. In
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), housing ownership for two-person
households is low for young households and then increases to 75% at the age of 30, staying
°at and declining only slightly after age 75 (Venti and Wise (2004)). They ¯nd that in the
absence of a shock, death of a spouse or entry of a family member into a nursing home,
families are unlikely to discontinue home ownership. And even when there is a precipitating
shock, discontinuing ownership is the exception rather than the rule. Thus the rental market
is probably relevant for young households but less relevant for middle and old age households.
I could incorporate a rental market into the framework to see if the results presented in this
paper are robust to the existence of a rental market.
I assume that there is no cost of borrowing using housing as collateral. The ¯xed closing
costs associated with re¯nancing a mortgage or applying for a second mortgage are estimated
at 1.5 to 2.5 percent of the household's initial mortgage balance, although accessing home
equity has become much easier in the 1990's relative to the 1980's (Bennett, Peach and
Peristiani (2001)). Hurst and Sta®ord (2003) explore the use of equity as a mechanism by
which households smooth their consumption over time and ¯nd that households with low
income realizations are much more likely to re¯nance than households with medium or high
income draws. Their analysis assumes households have ¯xed housing stock and focuses on
the impact of temporary income shocks on re¯nancing decisions. It will be interesting to
extend my model to look at the e®ect of income shocks on households moving decisions and
re¯nancing decisions jointly.
I assume that the elderly do no face any health shocks. Even in the presence of social
insurance (Medicare and Medicaid), households can face substantial out-of-pocket medical
expenses (see French and Jones (2004), Palumbo(1999) and Feenberg and Skinner(1994)).
Moreover nursing home expenses are potentially large and virtually uninsurable (Cohen, Tell
and Wallack(1986)). The risk of incurring such medical expenses might generate precaution-
ary savings and a®ect the wealth pro¯le (De Nardi, French and Jones(2005)). The e®ect of
medical costs on the life cycle consumption and saving in an environment with housing is left
for future research.
378 Appendix
8.1 Consumption ratio in a standard life cycle model







¯tE(st¡1U(ct;ht) + (1 ¡ st)V (ht+1 + at+1))g
subject to
ct + at+1 + ht+1 = yt + (1 + r)at + (1 ¡ ±h)ht (14)
ct ¸ 0;ht+1 ¸ 0; (15)
where ct is consumption of non-housing assets at age t; at+1 is non-housing assets at age t+1;
ht+1 is housing stock at age t + 1; yt is labor income at age t; which is stochastic, st is the
probability of surviving up to age t; where s0 is 1, r is the interest rate, ±h is depreciation
rate of housing stock, V is the utility from leaving bequest to their kids, while V = 0 implies
no bequest motives.
Theorem 1: The ratio of consumption of housing to non-housing goods should be age-
independent.
Proof of Theorem 1: Utility maximization implies that the following ¯rst order conditions
hold:
(16) [ct] : ¯tst¡1U1(ct;ht) = ¸t
(17) [at+1] : ¯t(1 ¡ st)V 0(at+1 + ht+1) + (1 + r)Et¸t+1 = ¸t
(18) [ht+1] : ¯t(1¡st)V 0(at+1+ht+1)+¯t+1stEtU2(ct+1;ht+1)+(1¡±h)Et¸t+1 = ¸t:
Therefore from equation (17) and (18), we get
(19) ¯t+1stEtU2(ct+1;ht+1) + (1 ¡ ±h)Et¸t+1 = (1 + r)Et¸t+1;





= (r + ±h):











g(c;h) = (!(c)¾ + (1 ¡ !)h¾)
1
¾; (24)
then the ratio of housing to non-housing consumption is independent of age t;
(25)
(1 ¡ !)h¾¡1
!c¾¡1 = (r + ±h):










The above model implies that the ratio of consumption of housing to non-housing goods
should not be age-dependent. The implication of the above model is not consistent with the
facts that later in life consumption of housing is °at while consumption of non-housing goods
is declining.
8.2 De¯nition of the stationary equilibrium
I focus on an equilibrium concept where factor prices are constant over time and where
capital and labor are constant in per capita terms. In addition, the age-wealth distribution
is stationary over time. Each agent's state is denoted by x: An equilibrium is described as
follows.
De¯nition 1 A stationary equilibrium is given by government policies ¿l;P; an interest
rate r and a wage rate w; value functions V (x); allocations c(x), a0(x), h0(x); a family
of probability distributions for bequests ¹b(x;:) for a person with state x; and a constant
distribution of people over the state variables x: m¤(x), such that the following conditions
hold:
(i) Given the government policies, the interest rate, the wage, and the expected bequest
39distribution, the functions V (x); c(x), a0(x), and h0(x) solve the above described maximization
problem for a household with state variables x.
(ii) m¤ is the invariant distribution of households over the state variables for this econ-
omy.15





















K + (1 + n)H ¡ ((1 ¡ ±h)H ¡ Tc):
(iv) The price of each factor is equal to its marginal product.
r = F1(K;L) ¡ ±k; w = F2(K;L):
(v) The family of expected bequest distributions is consistent with the bequests that are
actually left by the parents.16
(vi) Government budget is balanced at each period.
8.3 Transition function
From the policy rules and the exogenous Markov process for productivity, we can derive a
transition function f M(x;¢), which is the probability distribution of x0 (the state in the next
period), conditional on x, for a person who behaves according to the policy rules c(x); a0(x)
and h0(x). Let P be the cardinal set of f1;:::;Tg and D indicates that a person is dead, and
W = f(a;h) 2 R £ R+ : a ¸ ¡(1 ¡ µ)hg. The measurable space over which f M is de¯ned is
( e X, B( e X)), with
X = f1;:::;Tg £ W £ Y £ (Y [ f0g)
B(X) = P(f1;:::;Tg) £ B(W) £ B(Y ) £ B(Y [ f0g)
e X = X [ D
B( e X) = fx : x = X [ d;X 2 B(X);d 2 (Á;D)g);
To characterize f M, it is enough to display it for the sets L(t; a; h; y; yp) = f(t0;a0;h0;y0;yp0) 2
15I normalize m
¤ so that m
¤(X) = 1, which implies that m
¤(Â) is the fraction of people alive that are in a
state Â. Appendix 8.3 describes the calculation of invariant distribution in greater detail.
16Appendix 8.4 describes the consistency of bequest distribution in greater detail.




> > > <
> > > :
ptIt+1·tQy(y;[0;y] \ Y )Ih0(x)·hfIa0(x)·a(Iyp=0 + Iyp·yppt+6)
+ ¹b(x : [0;a ¡ a0(x)](1 ¡ pt+6)Iyp>0g; if x 6= D
0; if x = D;
where I is an indicator function, which equals one if the subscript property is true and zero
otherwise.
In the above equation, pt is the probability of surviving into the next period. The presence
of It+1·t shows that conditional on survival, a person currently of age t will be of age t+1 next
period. The person's evolution of productivity is described by Qy. Note that the evolution of
productivity, a person's survival, and the survival of the person's parent are independent of
each other. If the person's parent is already dead, that is, yp = 0, the person cannot receive
bequests anymore, and his or her assets next period are a0(x) for sure. (As discussed above,
this is always the relevant case for people younger than 30 or older than 50.) If, instead,
the parent is still alive, that is, yp > 0, the parent can survive into the next period with
probability pt+6. In that case, tomorrow's assets for the person will be a0(x) and yp0 = yp.
Alternatively, the parent may die, with probability 1¡pt+6. In this case, the person inherits
next period, yp0 = 0, and the probability that next period's assets are no more than a is the
probability of receiving a bequest between 0 and a¡a0(x). The last line shows that death is
an absorbing state.
In the economy as a whole, I am not interested in keeping track of dead people, so I will
de¯ne an operator on measures on (X, B(X)). Furthermore, I must take into account that
new people enter the economy in each period. The transition function is de¯ned as
(27) M(x;L(t;a;h;y;yp)) =
f M(x;L(t;a;h;y;yp)) + n6It=6Qyh(y;[0;y] \ Y )Iy=yp0
n
:
The transition function M di®ers from f M in two ways. First, it accounts for population
growth: when population grows at rate n, a group that is 1% of the population becomes
1=(1 + n)% in the subsequent period. Second, it accounts for births, which explains the
second term in the numerator. If a person is 50 years old (t = 7), that person's children
(there are (1 + n)6 of them) will enter the economy next period. All of those children
have age t = 1 and zero assets and zero housing. Their stochastic productivity is inherited
from their 50-year-old parents, according to the transition function Qyh. y is their parent's
productivity at 50.
Let i¤ be the invariant distribution of earnings at age 20 and parent's earnings at age 50.
41The invariant distribution is de¯ned recursively as following:
m¤(f0g £ Â £ f0g £ f0g) = i¤(Â) 8Â 2 B(Y ) £ B(Y [ f0g)
m¤(f0g £ Â £ W n ff0g £ f0gg) = 0 8Â 2 B(Y ) £ B(Y [ f0g)
m¤(ft + 1g £ Â) =
Z
M(x;Â)m¤(ftg £ dx) 8t > 1;8Â 2 B(W) £ B(Y ) £ B(Y [ f0g):
8.4 Consistency of bequest distributions
I want to calculate the distribution l(¢jt;y) of parents at age 50-80, conditional on the parent's
productivity at age 50 and conditional on being alive. First I de¯ne m¤
t;y as the marginal
distribution of x given age t and productivity y as
(28) m¤
t;y(Ât;y) = m¤(x 2 X : (t;y) 2 Ât;y) 8Ât;y 2 P(f1;:::;Tg) £ B(Y ):
Next I de¯ne m¤(¢jt;y) as a probability distribution on (X; B(X)) for any given (t;y): For




t;y(dt;dy) = m¤(Â) 8Â 2 B(X) 8Ât;y 2 P(f1;:::;Tg) £ B(Y ):
The children observe the parent's productivity at age 50. Therefore the conditional
distribution of the parent at age 50 at productivity level yp is m¤(¢jt = 7;y = yp): Therefore
l(Âjt = 7;y = yp) = m¤(Âjt = 7;y = yp) and recursively using the transition function f M
de¯ned in the section above, we de¯ne






Since the bequest is evenly distributed among children, the probability distributions for
bequests ¹b(x;:) for a person with state x = (t;a;h;y;yp) is given by
¹b(x : Â) = l(a 2 R+;h 2 R+ : ((1 + n)6a + (1 + n)6(h(1 ¡ ½1)) 2 Âjt + 6;yp)
8Â 2 B(R+); 8a;h 2 W 8y;yp 2 B(Y ):
8.5 Calibration
I calibrate my model following Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Diaz and Luengo-Prado
(2003). I use data from the National Income and Product Accounts and the Fixed Assets
Tables published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the year 1959-2001. In order to
42properly calibrate a model with two assets and without government taxes and expenditures,
I make some imputations.
I de¯ne measured GDP as the sum of each ¯nal expenditures:
(30) GDP = (c + sh + icd + cg) + (iprk + ipnrk + ig) + nx + 4inv;
where c; sh; icd and cg are expenditures on non-housing and service excluding housing,
housing services, expenditures on consumer durables, government consumption expenditures,
respectively. Thus c+sh+icd +cg are total consumption expenditure. iprk; ipnrk and ig are
total private residential investment, nonresidential investment and government investment,
respectively. Thus iprk + ipnrk + ig are total investment.
I also write GDP as the sum of wages plus rents of residential and nonresidential stocks
of capital:
GDP = we + prk ¢ rprk + pnrk ¢ rpnrk:
To explicitly consider the existence of residential housing I rearrange output as
(31) GDP = (c + icd + cg) + sh + iprk + (ipnrk + ig + nx + 4inv):
Since there is no rental market in this model, I subtract rental income from residential
housing from GDP.
Y = we + pnrk ¢ rpnrk = GDP ¡ sh
K = pnrk + inv + g
H = prk
ih = iprk;
where K includes private ¯xed non-residential assets and government ¯xed non-residential
assets, H includes private ¯xed residential assets and government ¯xed residential assets.
Both measures are taken from the Fixed Assets Tables.
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995), I de¯ne unambiguous capital income (UCI) as
rental income, corporate pro¯ts and net interest, and de¯ne ambiguous capital income (ACI)
as other income excluding wage and depreciation. Thus capital income Yk is de¯ned as
UCI+®¢ACI+depreciation-sh=®¢Y: Subtracting housing from output, the share of capital is
calibrated as
(32) ® = (UCI + dep ¡ sh)=(Y ¡ ACI):
I compute an average share of capital ® = 0:2261, an average capital-output ratio K
Y =
1:9887, an investment-capital ratio
ik
k = 0:082, a housing stock to output ratio H
Y = 1:2141,
43an investment-housing stock ratio
ih
H = 0:041 and a non-housing to housing investment ratio
C
ih = 15:9443. The implied depreciation rates is ±k = ik
k ¡ n = 0:07;±h = ih
H ¡ n = 0:0294;
interest rate net of depreciation in a steady state is r = ® Y
K ¡ ±k = 4:37%:
8.6 Computation of the model
Since I introduce the non-convex transaction costs on housing, I could not use Euler equation
approximation or policy function iteration. Hence I solve the model using approximation of
value functions.
To compute the steady state of my model, I ¯rst discretize income process and income
inheritance process following Tauchen and Hussey (1991). The state space for housing and
asset holdings are discretized. The upper bounds on the grids are chosen large enough so
that they do not constitute a constraint on the optimization problem. Using these grids I
can store the value functions and the distribution of households as ¯nite-dimensional arrays.
I solve the approximated optimal consumption and saving plans recursively. Households
surviving to the last period T has an easy problem to solve. Based on the period T policy
functions, I solve the consumption and saving decisions that maximize the period T ¡ 1
value function. The same procedure is carried back until decision rules in the ¯rst period are
computed for a large number of states.
I solve for the steady state equilibrium as follows:
1. Given an initial guess of interest rate r, use the equilibrium conditions in the factor
markets to obtain the wage rate w.
2. Set the interval for housing and assets.
3. Guess an initial bequest distribution.
4. Set value function after the last period to be 0 and solve the value function for the
last period of life for each of the points of the grid. This yields policy functions and value
function at the last period.
5. By backward induction, repeat step 4 until the ¯rst period in life.
6. Compute the associated stationary distribution of households by forward induction
using the policy functions starting from the known distribution over types of age.
7. Given the stationary distribution and policy functions, compute the bequest distribu-
tion. If the bequest distributions converges, go to step 8; otherwise go to step 3.
8. Check if the distributions of housing and assets do not have a large mass at the
maximum levels. If so, increase the maximum level and go back to step 2. If not, continue
to step 9.
9. Given the stationary distribution and prices, compute factor input demands and
supplies and check market clearing conditions hold. If all markets clear, an equilibrium is
found. If not, go to step 1 and update interest rate r.
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